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Introduction – Implementation of Official User Fees to Eradicate
Informal Payments
User fees for health care services are a frequently applied policy tool to improve efficiency by
controlling demand and contain costs. It is also applied to increase resources for health care,
especially when public resources are limited or the increase of income-related contributions is not
feasible or not desirable. In addition, in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, where
informal payments are widespread, the introduction of user fees is often promoted by politicians
and policy makers as a potential policy tool to eradicate or “formalize” informal payments (1).
Informal payments are unofficial cash payments or gifts in kinds directly given to the health care
personnel before or after using health care services. The literature on informal payments suggests
that these payments violate the idea of transparency in health care financing and the accountability
of providers, which results in an inefficient use of health care resources and inequalities in access to
health care Furthermore, informal payments create adverse incentives for their beneficiaries, which
can be in conflict with the government’s policy objectives. (2).
Thus, in the last decades in theCEE countries, several policies have been implemented to eradicate
these payments, including the introduction of official user fees for health care services. However,
there is no evidence that supports this expectation. On the contrary, there is evidence to suggest
that patients continue to pay informally after the introduction of user fees (3–5). In this case, user
fees induce a double financial burden on patients, aggravating the existing problems caused by the
informal payments. This makes user fees even more unpopular among the public.
According to the OECD Health Statistics in Hungary, the total health expenditure accounts for
8% of the GDP in 2012, with a per capita expenditure of 1,358 USD, which is lower than the
OECD average. The share of out-of-pocket payments in total health expenditure has increased
considerably during the last decades, and has reached 28.3% in 2012, and accounts for about 5% of
the total household expenditure. This level is one of the highest among European OECD countries.
Above 80% of these payments are co-payments for pharmaceuticals (80%). There are no official co-
payments for health care services, however informal payments are widespread. Hungarian health
care consumers have been paying informally for medical services on a routine basis, especially in in-
patient care. According to a study carried out in 2010 around one-fifth of the respondents who used
physician services during the last 12months, made informal payments, on average 60AC, and almost
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half of the respondents who were hospitalized during the last
12months, paid informally on average 130AC (6). Studies suggest
that the scale of these payments has not changed considerably
during the last two decades. (7).
In 2007 in Hungary, official user fees were introduced for the
use of health care services covered by the social health insurance.
The introduction of these fees was one element of the reform
package to contain health care cost. According to the documented
policy objectives, it was expected that official fees will contribute
to the eradication of informal payments (8).
Although the amount of user fees was relatively low (about
1AC per physician visit and per day spent in hospital), the imple-
mentation met with strong political opposition and unpopularity
among the public. One year later, in April 2008, the payments were
abolished as a result of a population referendum initiated by the
opposition party in the parliament, where more than 80% of the
voters supported the abolishment of the fees (8).
The introduction and abolishment of users fees in Hungary
can be considered a natural experiment, and enable us to study
the association of formal and informal charges. The aim of this
paper is to summarize findings on this issue based on studies
carried out to examine the Hungarian case, and draw some policy
conclusions.
Unclear Equity Effects – Decrease of
Informal Payments in Low-Income
Households
Studying Hungarian households’ expenditure on formal and
informal charges during a 4-year period (2005–2008) including
the implementation and abolishment of user charges, Baji et al.
found, that the co-payments lead to a relatively greater burden on
worse-off households. [The Kakwani-index of formal household
expenditure for health care services decreased from 0 to  0.1 in
2007 (9)]. At the same time, the study suggests that the increase
of formal payments was partly compensated by the decrease of
informal payments, especially in low-income households.
During the 1-year period (2007) when user fees were charged
for the utilization of health care services, household expenditure
on informal payments decreased and became less regressive, i.e.,
the decrease of informal payments was higher in lower-income
households (the share of informal payments decreased from 0.56
to 0.26% of the household income in the poorest quintile, and
from 0.20 to 0.14% in the richest quintile). The reduction of infor-
mal payments can partly be explained by the drop in the utilization
of services, which was recorded during this period. However, a
higher decrease in the expenditure on informal payments among
low-income households was observed, which also suggests that
worse-off households tried to compensate the increase of formal
payments by decreasing their expenditure on informal ones.
In another study, Baji et al., analyzed the short-term changes in
the probability of paying informally for in-patient and out-patient
care 2months after the implementation of user fees. The findings
suggest that the probability of paying informally decreased only
for hospitalization among elderly people (10). Elderly with a lower
ability to pay respond to the increased burden of formal payments
with a decrease of their expenditure on informal payments, as
elderly people are likely to be among lower-income households
in Hungary.
Overall, the results presented above suggest that the implemen-
tation of user fees can lead to a reduction of informal payments of
those health care consumers who are not able to meet the double
burden. However, this finding raises questions concerning equal
access to health care services. It is possible that consumers, who are
not able to pay informally for health care services, may not obtain
the services that other consumers obtain because they continue to
pay. In this way, the reduction of informal payments can create
even greater inequalities between different income groups.
Complements or Substitutes?
Nevertheless, both studies show that informal payments remain
relevant. For those who are able to pay and have no budget-
constraints, formal payments do not substitute for informal pay-
ments, at least at the short term, these payments rather co-exist
and complement each other.
Findings from a qualitative study provide some explanation
for this (11). Consumers argue that neither the measure nor
the objectives, nor the beneficiary of informal payments is the
same as those of user fees. Formal and informal payments serve
different objectives, and consumers achieve different benefits by
paying formally and informally. In Hungary, informal payments
are directly pocketed by physicians (mostly by the head/manager)
and contribute to their income. In this way, these payments may
affect the choice of the physician, the attitude of the personnel,
or in some cases, even the access to services. On the other hand,
formal payments have more potential when used to improve
equipment or the maintenance of health care facilities or if oth-
erwise reinvested in health care provision. However, according to
public opinion, the user fees introduced in 2007 did not contribute
to the improvement of service quality (11).
Also, attributes connected to the health care personnel (i.e., the
skills and reputation of the physician, as well as the attitude of the
health care personnel) are more important for health care con-
sumers than other service attributes, like the health care facility,
equipment or even waiting time for the visits, or traveling time to
the health care facility (12). These results indicate the importance
of the patient–physician relationship. Since informal payments are
a relevant element of this relationship, it is quite probable that
despite the formal charges, patients continue to pay informally
directly to their physician, as an expression of their gratitude or in
the hope of getting extra services, better access or more personal
attention. Or, they keep on paying informally, because of the fear
that they do not obtain the care they need if they do not pay.
Furthermore, Hungarian health care consumers are rather tol-
erant toward informal payments, mainly because these payments
provide additional salary to the (underpaid) health care person-
nel (2). Also, some population groups (e.g., elderly people and
consumers from the capital) seem to prefer paying informally for
health care services (6).
To summarize, health care consumers doubt that user fees in
2007 had the potential to eradicate informal payments as for-
mal fees do not substitute for informal payments. The lack of
support for the stated policy objectives makes the implementation
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of these charges more unpopular and this might be one of the
reasons why the fees were rejected by the population in the
referendum. Findings suggest that the problem of informal pay-
ments remains relevant even after the implementation of user
fees. However, if formal payments do not substitute for informal
payments, user fees induce a double financial burden on health
care consumers, and make official charges less acceptable to the
public.
Policy Implications of the Findings
After the implementation of user fees, informal payments remain
relevant and the two payments co-exist. However, the increase
of formal payments may indeed lead to a decrease in informal
payments, specifically among low-income householdswho are not
able to pay for the double (formal and informal) price.
Regarding the policy implications, we can say that the reduc-
tion of informal payments is a desirable policy aim because of
the adverse effect of these payments on the health care system,
i.e., inefficient use of resources, barrier to access, and adverse
financial incentives for beneficiaries. However, if the decrease of
these payments only occurs among the lower-income households,
among those who are not able to pay for the double burden, this
mechanism can increase inequalities in access among households
with different income. Those who are able to pay for the double
burdenmay have better access to health care services compared to
those who are not able to pay. Thus, the implementation of user
fees is hardly sufficient and rather a controversial policy tool to
diminish informal payments.
The Hungarian experience with the implementation of user
fees confirms that public acceptance is crucial for a successful
implementation of user fees. However, in Hungary the declared
policy objectives of the implementation of the user fees were not
supported by the public, making the implementation of these
charges more unpopular.
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